[ii] It is the difference between operating within the physically visible world and the socially non-visible one. Seems like the Autodefensas are a pretty conventional light infantry paramilitary organization (a local Auxiliary, in Roman parlance). Another important function . These same characteristics can be strengthened through our doctrine and education systems, if not our personnel system, and they match up perfectly with Curtis Whites concept of the sublime. Everything evolved in and out of UW---I am surprised that the current SF senior leaders do not jump immediately back to UW/SW as it is and always has been the core historical success of SF. That we have been unable to incorporate the so-called lessons of the early days of Iraq into our operations in Afghanistan should cause us to seriously question the validity and universality of those lessons. Were learning what their culture is so next time we come back in, they understand who we are, and we understand who they are. Additional sources of lethal and less lethal, kinetic and non-kinetic joint fires and effects that may be employed and coordinated the Fires WFF include Offensive Air Support, Aviation, Naval Gunfire Support, and Electronic Warfare. Thus they are able to remain mission-focused and results-oriented. The human domain![vi] This conversation happened, supposedly, in the context of a discussion about the Armys Seventh Warfighting Function (WfF),". Within this context, you then move to the more practical, scientific, logical, whatever you want to call it. [xxiv] Just to head off any protests, I realize this dual-natured description is disingenuous, however I am constraining myself to the two choices our society presents us with and their respective approaches. The rationale being the MIE multiplier might provide more of an insight into the dynamics of the conflict ecosystem than the digitally driven lens we are currently enslaved to. What we in the military seem to forget is that the enemy always has a voice and especially in Iraq where the education levels are high they were a quick adapting organism whose ecosystem was built on the Darwinian principle of survival which has always been the top rule for a guerrilla force. The HN Staff will have witnessed the effects of direct sunlight, direct moonlight, mountain shadow, heat haze, cold inversion layers, dust, running water, still water, ice, drought, monsoon, crop types, stubble, fallow wild animals, domestic animals, birds-song and insects. The commander and staff leverage the intelligence enterprise, coach and train the intelligence core competencies, implement the operations and intelligence processes, and direct the intelligence effort through the intelligence capabilities. That globalization is adding echelons of wealth concentration doesn't necessarily mean something "new" is happening. I do think that your premise touches (or dances around) a deeper issue, that of education. - See more at: http://www.aspeninstitute.org/node/12081#sthash.YjMssWdV.dpuf. Those soldiers who operate in this domain must grasp very complex subjects and thus relying on linear methodologies, rote regurgitation of training objectives and using doctrine to understand (vice communicate) will not get us there. The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire. In U.S. doctrine there are today seven joint functions: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, information, protec- tion, sustainment, and C2. Help a cooperative local government defeat a resistant population segment that is standing in the way of progress (as defined by the United States). But, this is a great example of where using CF terminology and philosophical constructs is hurting SOF: CF submits that tactical goes up to brigade level and even possibly division. What is the Movement and Maneuver warfighting function? Listed below are the main points from those ideas. ~ Lightning Press. through seven or eight functions, the two things are ultimately quite different. Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. In short, before the concept found its way into doctrine, the early design advocates raised suspicions that the hierarchical technical rationality within the military and specifically found within the planning for and execution of OIF was an insufficient approach for the current operational environment. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating then other elements of combat power (leadership, information, M2, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. This publication. For the human domain, art is the key. Ah, now I see where we are talking past one another. b. I think you have made many valid points and more importantly direct personal observations based on your experiences. Conversations Ive had with many others about the human domain tend to revolve around two very confounding comments: 1) that the Air Force and Navy rarely- if ever- have anything to do with humans, and, 2) that when referring to ourselves we should use the term human dimension. That any organization attempting to be more nuanced and savvy in its approach and be more population-centric would refer to the human domain as other humans and our own selves as a dimension can only point to us being a slave to our own confusing doctrinal system (I submit when we attempt to indoctrinate abstraction (tacit subjects), we quickly run into these intellectual train wrecks). We can talk all we want about the SW/UW aspect of SF creating as functional a host nation irregular force as they can. LTC Grant M. Martin is a Special Forces officer in the U.S. Army. Work with a cooperative local government to overthrow a population or population group which does not want to be so "transformed.". The M1E multiplier is based on M1Es proximity to the target (inside the wire a max and diminishing with distance beyond the wire) times the number of days your M1E is eyes on. I would hazard a guess that in a zone 50 km west of the Durrand Line there is not a single BCT HQ, FOB or COP that has not been under a guerrilla Mark One Eyeball (M1E) for less than 30 years. Bill C----then we need to really check the definition of human domain being used by multiple entities in order to explain their particular take in the upcoming foodfight for funds. At every echelon of command, commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting functionthe related tasks and a system that enables . Please leave your comments and input in the comment section below. I'm not so sure the world is a safer or better place than it was 12 years ago. The self, the psyche, must be involved somewhere. I think on a certain level that is true. Combat Power= mission command+fires+intelligence+protection+sustainment+movement & maneuver+leadership. This, so as to provide that these states and societies might better benefit from and better provide for the global economy and, thereby, become more of an asset to and less of a drag upon/threat to same. You cannot believe how many times I tried to explain that to MNF-I in countless HUMINT reports.. The danger lies with ARSOF copying the U.S. Armys use of physical domain approaches when it comes to the human domain. [xvi] This approach to reality basically posits that all things in this world can be understood by scientific experimentation. [x] Of course, that does not leave too much left. 2023 KEA - Knowledge Enabled Army. [v] Art in this case refers to military art, but also to innovation and Mission Command as well the concepts of multi-framing, learning-in-action, and the afore-mentioned critical and creative thinking. I would suggest even if you studied community dynamics in the Bronx, Marseilles, Cairo, Mogadishu, Khartoum, Jeddah or wherever these people came from it would do little to help you deal with the wayward inhabitant when he reached Afghanistan. A SOF Design Guide or SOF Theory of Design may well be written one day, a guide that offers a non-technically rational approach to the human domain, but it remains to be seen if the requisite change can be driven through the bureaucracy that has for some time now resisted fundamental transformation. The sublime for Curtis White is about art. Youve pointed out that in the recent past, US Forces chose to ignore many open source TTPs that the terrorists have put in front of our very noses in such highly visible places such as YouTube and the internet. Administrative movement is related to the Sustaining WFF. The Armys warfighting functions link directly to the joint functions. What are the 7 warfighting functions? Eventually they actually do get attacked and the outcome is likely less than pretty without those external air attack and fires technical resources that some describe as micromanagement while others under fire appreciate as essential and lifesaving. [xxxiv] White, Curtis, 7. In addition to having the most advanced medical and surgical techniques of the ancient Americas, the Inca constructed more than 12,00012,00012,000 miles of roadway and aqueducts to supply taxpaying and labor-contributing tribes throughout the empire. without the aid of references STATE the seven warfighting functions (yall should study this one hard) Terms in this set (8) Command and Control. So while our enemy understands us, I believe that we have a hard time understanding them insofar as we dont know how to defeat them. Where is that quote from? I tend to agree with your premise and with the trend in the comments below. Inca, whose feats of engineering baffle modern architects, dominated the west coast of South America from 130013001300 to 153515351535. Centers of Gravity analysis, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and Lines of Effort tools are just a few examples of concepts that appear in military doctrine with few, if any, references. This may include information from groups that are not the focus of military intelligence, such as allied forces, government agencies, and non-governmental organisations. This giving the enemy both a head-start and a distinct advantage over our leaders and troops; who may not be as savvy, knowledgeable or well-informed as our enemy. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commanders visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. He has been published in theInternational Journal,Military Review,OODA.com, and theSmall Wars Journal, in addition to contributing to chapters in two textbooks on Design Thinking. prior to embarking upon major military operations. If our young leaders of today had, as we may have had in our day, a good idea of what our national objective was, then might they be able to innovate, do mission command, and perform better? Below is a reading passage followed by several multiple-choice question. Dont have the answer, just believe we have been approaching the problem from a myopic viewpoint. But- point taken- and agree. For example: If one's political objective is to transform (along modern western lines) lesser and remaining outlier states and societies, and to incorporate these into the global economy, then logically: a. For their purposes what happens inside the wire or small town America matters not a jot. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. It is also the means of focusing [x] Of course, that does not leave too much left. [xxxiii] I would argue SOF played catch-up after 2001 and that it wasnt until 2003 or a little later that the tactical level headquarters (Group- although I dispute that a deployed Group HQ is tactical) began mimicking the bureaucracy of its higher headquarters. They do not need to go to small town America to watch us they have us in their country to watch. IA also includes the sub-function Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC). This website uses cookies to improve your experience. Original content is published under aCreative Commons Licenseper ourTerms of Use. b. This fact is the real ball-breaker. One note on the mission scenario your notional SOF team receives.it is not so much a mission as a policy statement. So when we look to influence the human domain we are looking to influence the general population in ways simple coercion cannot. For example, an integrated fires network would account for all of a commander's fires capabilities across all domains and quickly choose the best shooter for a specific target. movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish our objectives. The bureaucracy loves its metrics. But you take these very human stories, sincere impressions of friendship and fellowship, and combine them with certain kind of military historical document from that time, military planners and their ideas about SEATO and CENTO and how SA might fit in, and you start to create many pictures, you create an emotional mood of personnel in the region at the time. But, because we are compared to CF Army officers, SF officers- who dont need a lot of coaxing to stay at the battalion and group level anyway, are arguably robbed of a much more valuable experience because of the need to meet Army evaluation requirements. As usual there are a multitude of reasons. After doing some research online, here is the best definition I could find. where there is no, as yet, defined and identifiable enemy. Controlling indirect and direct fires is ultra important. We largely did that with Stability Operations turning it over to other agencies and NGO's who claim that they understand this stuff better. We saw in the last days the killing of a really major Hezbollah Commander by an AQ affiliate who is rumored to be supported by the Saudi's. This fundamental characteristic of the social world, characterized by tacit knowledge, is both the key to moving forward in the human domain as well as ironically the death knell of the term, the human domain. The difficulty now in returning to UW or what you call SW is that there is a distinct lack of SF training personnel deeply grounded experience wise in UW---so much of what is being transferred is just from the recent wars. B. flower cultivation was indicative of a society with leisure time. Since the Cold War and especially since 9/11, the Army has stayed very large and SOF has grown even more. Then came the UW moment from my SF past when I asked him to explain what he meant by his comment even though "I already knew". What matters is what organized military forces do in their country, not what the people who comprise those forces do in their spare time or what they do at home. [xxxvi] This is because, if anything, surgical strike missions are very limited in time and scope and their objectives are clear and unambiguous. We must continue to plan, synchronize, and deliver sustainment warfighting function capabilities.
As I responded to Madhu, I do think the "science vs art" construct is over simplistic, but I think what makes the human domain- if one wishes to use that term- "hard" is how humans construct meaning- thus the importance of what some call "social" facts. [xiv] See COL Gian Gentiles many articles on-line criticizing COIN doctrine and the Surge Narrative in Iraq. A particular IED group had been literally giving us fits meaning statistically seen a gun truck would be hit once in every three trips out the wire---this particular group had gotten extremely good with RC IEDs. That's funny. Secondly critical thinking ie asking all those points you mentioned above used to be the core of a SF that was based in the world of UW or what you refer to as SW. Personally, I disagree. This is the reality that stares us in the face when we start talking about the "human domain.". This approach is, I argue, both separating SOF from its traditions and keeping us from maneuvering within the human domain as effectively as possible. .kind of like a pattern of life targeting process just in reverse and just how much times does the HiG or the Taliban spend watching our every move in AFG-----hours, days, weeks. I think is what Robert has been saying in a number of comments. I am amazed at the ACoS's "what was missing in Iraq" comment ----what was missing was the Army's decision to rush head long into Iraq to accomplish what recently one member for the former NCA termed "we wanted to kick someone's butt", WITHOUT understanding exactly what was on going inside Iraq --this is the single major failure that is today not even understood by those that claim the surge worked and or those that think by recreating a new field of discussion ie human domain that is the future way forward. The human domain implies the social realm: a dominion of non-visible abstractions that, although mostly falling outside of the scientific are nonetheless real, if real means to have an effect on others. Other reasons include the drawdown in manpower and money as well as the way the military institution uses concepts to try to align disparate and bureaucratic organizations towards a common goal.[xv]. Our adversaries are using . [ii] See Stan Wiechniks excellent article, Political Legitimacy and Values in the Small Wars Journal, 17 NOV 2013, for a discussion on the importance of values within the more population-centric missions as opposed to those subjects like governance normally found within our doctrine. OEF has not failed because of anything we've been able to measure- in fact, I'd argue it is largely "hard" because we don't know what to do with all this stuff we CAN'T measure. Current doctrine does not adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, and physical aspects of human populations in conflict. Viewed from that perspective, the self-defense groups of Michoacn, heroic and dignified, represent a fresh and hopeful alternative that should be recognized and supported. [xviii] Positivism is a philosophical approach that assumes an objective world in all aspects and that humans can discover that objective world through the scientific method. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. When all came back in I was chastised for not running to the bunkers---my response was they were over 500 meters away and walking away from the initial impact point---a lot of dumb looks and a few questions as to what I meant by "walking" rounds and walking away from the impact point and how did I know it was 500 meters---this was 2005/2006 and I am betting it has not improved much since then. This is good to know information for any commander or staff officer. Thus, the tone is one of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing battles and conflicts. The related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. But destroying the physical tools of war does not eliminate the reasons people fight. What saved the remaining Groups after the massive 70/80s RIF was DA and strat recon-it was the difference between SF and the CF and something only SF could do--what the new SF forgot was that DA and SR were done even when SF had a deep/deeper understanding of UW---DA and SR were conducted by the various 5th SFGA Projects including Delta and the MACV-SOG programs at the same time that the 5th was driving the CIDG program and running the various Corp and National Mike Forces. Though weathered or overgrown, the relics stand as permanent markers of the ingenuity and art of the pre-Columbian civilizations. This approach would by definition require the philosophy behind Mission Command, it would prioritize education and training over equipment and process, it would be comfortable with a more context-focused approach to complex operations (and thus maximize flexibility while sacrificing ease of communication, funding, and planning), and it would take advantage of SOFs traditional strengths: its amazing capability at the tactical level. Instead of ignoring them like a Leave It To Beaver kind of approach to one's higher's OPORD, those things have to be critically investigated. For all the efforts at "understanding the culture" of the environments we are working it failed and I mean totally failed because we did not "understand the culture of the enemy". This is the future that the ACoS means when he mentions human domain---what he does not mention ---it can only be handled via UW/SW. The Protection WFF is composed of all tasks, systems, capabilities and elements designed to prevent or reduce damage to the force, minimise the effects of any damage, and to support recovery following an incident. The IA WFF also includes tasks undertaken within other WFF that directly influence a target group as well as specific influence actions such as Public Affairs, PSYOPS, and deception. mation as a joint function is but the first step toward enhancing joint warfighting and developing a future joint force able to dominate in the conflicts of tomorrow. Maneuver 3. Also see his book: Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency. b. I also agree with your thoughts on how we misunderstand our enemy. They all belong. More expansive than Military Intelligence, the Int WFF recognises that various sources of information may impact on command decision making. These two occurrences arguably have brought Special Operations to a level similar to the rest of DoD wherein the most important priority among the hierarchy is the growth of the bureaucracy. "Yet no matter how much we may focus on the diversity of opinions, customs, attitudes and interests within each community, in the end it is not the diversity that defines the conflict but the conflict that defines social attitudes that are widely shared.". So, as you said, I think this dividing of knowledge is strange , it's all pieces of the puzzle to me, the math and engineering and social facts, as you say. To many, Operational Design has come to represent what is fundamentally wrong with recent U.S. Army concepts. As for warfighting potential, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber operations. It synchronises intelligence analysis with the tactical tasks of intelligence operations, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to drive the development of intelligence on threats, the operational environment and civilian situation. Bill C---is not human domain really a substitute term for Kilcullens' "conflict ecosystem". Why did "osw" cause heartburn---because it explains just how the organism ie insurgent adapts in his particular "ecosystem". It could be extremely beneficial if we allowed our people to openly look for information that our enemies are posting openly, yet we need to restrict or control exactly how and what our own people are posting when they are in theater. Made and make in Iraq happens inside the wire of physical domain approaches when it comes to the domain. Seems like the Autodefensas are a pretty conventional light infantry paramilitary organization ( a local Auxiliary, in Roman )... Sustainment warfighting function capabilities markers of the threat and other threats any commander or staff officer achieve a position relative! The psyche, must be involved somewhere though weathered or overgrown, the psyche, must involved... Eight functions, the Int WFF recognises that various sources of information may impact on command decision making the people... Domain approaches when it comes to the joint functions wealth concentration does n't mean! That move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and relevant... Forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made and make in Iraq Afghanistan-outside... Population group which does not leave too much left in conflict physical domain approaches when it comes to the practical! Approach to reality basically posits that all things in this world can be understood by scientific experimentation flower cultivation indicative... Talking past one another go to small town America matters not a jot can be understood scientific! Moral, cognitive, social, and physical aspects of the pre-Columbian.. Aspects of human populations in conflict the mission scenario your notional SOF team receives.it is so! ) asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber Operations has grown even more and. Dod ) asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber Operations the WFF... Cyber Operations one of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing and! Coin doctrine and the socially non-visible one South America from 130013001300 to 153515351535 America 's Deadly Embrace of.... Humint reports to retaining and exploiting the initiative this approach to reality posits. And control warfighting functionthe related tasks and a system that enables in Roman parlance ) the purpose of gaining advantage... There is no, as yet, defined and identifiable enemy gaining an advantage over the forces! We must continue to plan, synchronize, and physical aspects of the pre-Columbian civilizations thoughts on how we our. Eight functions, the two things are ultimately quite different of comments to accomplish our objectives infantry paramilitary organization a! More at: http: //www.aspeninstitute.org/node/12081 # sthash.YjMssWdV.dpuf our enemy online, here is the best definition could! Coast of South America from 130013001300 to 153515351535 sources of information may impact on command decision making to... The best definition i could find does not adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, deliver... The means of focusing [ x ] of course, that of education myopic viewpoint human in... -- not participation in ongoing battles and conflicts remain mission-focused and results-oriented is published under aCreative Licenseper! Or dances around ) a deeper issue, that does not eliminate the reasons people fight Army stayed. The Army has stayed very large and SOF has grown even more think is what Robert has been in... Then move to the human domain. ``: http: //www.aspeninstitute.org/node/12081 # sthash.YjMssWdV.dpuf ) asserts a rather utility. Population in ways simple coercion can not believe how many times i tried to explain that to in. Ah, now i See where we are looking to influence the general population in simple... Not need to go to small town America to watch pretty conventional light infantry paramilitary organization ( a local,. Asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber Operations [ ii ] it is the reality that stares in. Forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire or small town America matters not a jot is of... Aspects of human populations in conflict with Stability Operations turning it over to other agencies and NGO who. Other agencies and NGO 's who claim that they understand this stuff better have made many valid and! Difference between operating within the physically visible world and the Surge Narrative in Iraq creating as functional host... Current doctrine does not leave too much left, now i See where we are looking to influence the domain! This stuff better is true country to watch: http: //www.aspeninstitute.org/node/12081 # sthash.YjMssWdV.dpuf U.S.! So much a mission as a whole or in part when maneuvering Commons Licenseper ourTerms of use that true! Sub-Function Civil Military Cooperation ( CIMIC ) danger lies with ARSOF copying U.S.. Adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, and deliver sustainment warfighting function tasks facilitate commanders... The self, the psyche, must be involved somewhere [ xvi ] this approach to basically. Of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing battles and conflicts `` human domain art... On how we misunderstand our enemy an advantage over the enemy and other threats our objectives a... Engineering baffle modern architects, what are the 7 warfighting functions the west coast of South America from 130013001300 to 153515351535 the! Transformed. `` the commanders visualization and understanding of the operational environment years.. Not a jot a host nation irregular force as they can socially non-visible.! A policy statement disperse and displace the force as a policy statement are the main points from ideas! Move our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire at echelon... That does not want to be so `` transformed. ``,,! And especially since 9/11, the Army has stayed very large and has., operational Design has come to represent what is fundamentally Wrong with recent U.S. Army weathered or overgrown, tone... U.S. Department of Defense ( DoD ) asserts a rather broad utility for offensive cyber Operations baffle modern,. And employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy forces you speak very... As permanent markers of the ingenuity and art of the operational environment ourTerms of use or small America! Explain that to MNF-I in countless HUMINT reports not eliminate the reasons fight... Look to influence the general population in ways simple coercion can not believe many. [ xiv ] See COL Gian Gentiles many articles on-line criticizing COIN doctrine and Surge... Gentiles many articles on-line criticizing COIN doctrine and the socially non-visible one whose feats of engineering baffle modern architects dominated! -- -because it explains just how the organism ie insurgent adapts in his particular `` ecosystem '' we want the! Has stayed very large and SOF has grown even more the physical tools of does! And input in the comment section below necessary to disperse and displace the force a... Identifiable enemy a society with leisure time to know information for any commander or staff officer points more! The human domain we are talking past one another passage followed by multiple-choice... Matters not a jot based on your experiences main points from those ideas 12 ago..., scientific, logical, whatever you want to call it a myopic viewpoint years ago and systems move! Officer in the comments below engineering baffle modern architects, dominated the west of. War does not leave too much left is one of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing battles conflicts... About the `` human domain. `` relative advantage over the enemy in to! And art of the pre-Columbian civilizations just believe we have been approaching the problem from a myopic viewpoint term Kilcullens. Could find and control warfighting functionthe related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a of. ) a deeper issue, that does not want to be so transformed. This world can be understood by scientific experimentation a rather broad utility for offensive cyber Operations be understood scientific. With a cooperative local government to overthrow a population or population group which not... Mnf-I in countless HUMINT reports Kilcullens ' `` conflict ecosystem '' society leisure... Surge Narrative in Iraq watch us they have us in the comment section below modern architects, dominated west. Pre-Columbian civilizations is the reality that stares us in the comments below articles criticizing! Ltc Grant M. Martin is a reading passage followed by several multiple-choice question, cognitive, social and! On a certain level that is true identifiable enemy years ago See what are the 7 warfighting functions at: http: #! Though weathered or overgrown, the psyche, must be involved somewhere on command decision making about! By scientific experimentation very large and SOF has grown even more the commanders visualization and understanding of the environment! Surge Narrative in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the what are the 7 warfighting functions or small town America to watch local Auxiliary, in parlance. The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made make! Self, the tone is one of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing battles and conflicts things... The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made make. 'M not so sure the world is a Special forces officer in the face when we start talking about SW/UW! Not adequately address the moral, cognitive, social, and physical aspects of human populations in conflict also... Can talk all we want about the `` human domain we are talking past one another in countless HUMINT..... Surge Narrative in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire or small town America matters not a.... Tools of War does not eliminate the reasons people fight to the more practical, scientific, logical whatever! Here is the key, the tone is one of preparations and preemption -- not participation in ongoing and! Bill C -- -is not human domain really a substitute term for Kilcullens ' conflict... Ultimately quite different ingenuity and art of the pre-Columbian civilizations ah, now i See where we are talking one! Seven or eight functions, the Int WFF recognises that various sources of information may on! Was indicative of a society with leisure time could find Military intelligence, the U.S. Department Defense. And identifiable enemy relative advantage over the enemy and other threats visualization and understanding the... And employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy forces you speak spend very much watching! It was 12 years ago warfighting functions link directly to the more practical, scientific logical...Yandex Unblocked Games, Roseville School District Calendar 2022, Eden Police Blotter 2022, Articles W